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Equal Opportunity in Higher Education:
An Affirmative Response
Harlan A. Loeb*
Introduction
The showdown that could have decided the fate of affirma-
tive action in higher education has been averted-but only tem-
porarily. The United States Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari in Texas v. Hopwood' renders the legal status of ra-
cial admissions preferences in higher education clouded and the
meaning behind the landmark decision in Regents of the Univer-
sity of California v. Bakke2 uncertain. By electing not to review
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' controversial decision in
Hopwood v. Texas,3 the Court has also left institutions of higher
education, in the Fifth Circuit at least, without clear direction
about the role of race in admissions programs. The only cer-
tainty resulting from the legal battle over the University of
Texas School of Law's (UT) admissions program is that the con-
tinuing debate over affirmative action in admissions to colleges
and professional schools has been given new momentum.
Remedying the legacy of racism that pervades our society is
a moral imperative that extends to institutions of higher educa-
tion. Developing a legally consistent and constitutionally sound
model for dealing with the immensely complex challenge of cre-
ating equality of opportunity has proven to be a daunting task.
The juxtaposition of law and social policy as they relate to racial
preferences creates a "socio-legal" oxymoron. On the one hand,
* Harlan Loeb is Midwest Counsel for the Anti-Defamation League. He is an
honors graduate of the University of Minnesota Law School and is active with the
American Bar Association and its Individual Rights and Responsibilities section,
serving as Vice-Chair of the section's Civil Rights and Equal Opportunity Commit-
tee. The author would like to thank and acknowledge Steven Gordon, a student at
the University of Pennsylvania Law School, for the substantial contribution he
made to the preparation of this article.
1. 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
2. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 258 (1996).
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the law has demanded the elimination of the vestiges of over
two centuries of legally sanctioned racial discrimination. At the
same time, however, the law has been moving toward the postu-
late that color-blind decisionmaking is the mandated model.4
To accommodate these conflicting goals, courts have sanctioned
the use of race as a consideration in admissions programs but
have historically decorated the process with vagaries that seek
to comport with a "compelling governmental interest." These
vagaries include: remedying present effects of past discrimina-
tion and promoting of "diversity" within the student body. Not
surprisingly, the Court has struggled to reconcile the funda-
mental need for affirmative action with the illegality of absolute
preferences.
The decision in Hopwood highlights the paucity of instruc-
tive legal doctrine offered to institutions trying to create a level
playing field for groups that have been denied opportunity by
historical, sociological and economic conditions. Ironically, the
Fifth Circuit's decision may provide an outline of the legal con-
tours by which inclusive affirmative action programs should be
guided.
While the use of race per se is proscribed, state supported schools
may reasonably consider a host of factors-some of which may
have some correlation with race in making admissions decisions.
The federal courts have no warrant to intrude on those executive
and legislative judgments unless the distinctions intrude on spe-
cific provisions of federal law or the Constitution.5
The fact that an admissions policy has a disproportionate effect
or benefit for certain groups does not offend the United States
Constitution. In order to accommodate the legal admonition to
integrate institutions of higher education, while at the same
time remaining neutral in the decisionmaking process, colleges
and universities should pursue race neutral alternatives in ad-
missions programs that attack the very structure of societal ra-
cism. In the process, the legal ambiguities highlighted by
Hopwood may be best avoided.
4. "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
5. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
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Hopwood
The most recent legal battle over affirmative action began
in 1992 when UT rejected four white applicants, who subse-
quently challenged the UT admissions policy as a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 6 The
admissions program used a combination of the applicants'
LSAT scores and GPA's, called the Texas Index (TI), to make
initial admissions decisions. 7 The law school used more
favorable scores to admit and deny African-Americans and Mex-
ican-Americans than the scores used for the rest of the appli-
cant pool.8
The admissions system resembled that of the medical
school at the University of California which was deemed uncon-
stitutional in Bakke.9 However, the medical school used segre-
gated committees for all the applicants, as opposed to UT,
which used segregated committees only for discretionary stu-
dents. The two programs also diverged in that the medical
school program admitted students recommended by the special
admissions program 0 until it filled a prescribed quota." The
stated purpose of UT's program was to meet a "goal" of minority
representation, 12 but without a prescribed quota.
The Supreme Court was split four-to-four in the Bakke
case, with Justice Powell holding the swing vote.' 3 In a concur-
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938.
7. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 935.
8. Id. at 936. In March of 1992, the white applicants needed a TI score of 199
to be presumptively admitted. Id. at 936-37. African-American and Mexican-
American students needed only a score of 189. Id. at 937. The presumptive denial
score was 192 for whites and 179 for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans.
Id. at 936.
9. Bakke, 438 U.S. 266-67.
10. Id. at 265. Candidates were placed in the special admissions program if
they indicated on their application form that they wanted to be considered as "eco-
nomically and/or educationally disadvantaged" and were members of a minority
group. Id. The special candidates did not have to meet the grade point cutoff and
were not ranked against candidates in the general admissions process. Id.
11. Id.
12. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 937. The law school's goal was a class consisting of
10% Mexican-American and 5% African-American. Id. These percentages were
roughly comparable to the percentages of Mexican-Americans and blacks graduat-
ing from Texas colleges. Id.
13. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932, 942 (noting that Justice
Powell was the swing vote in Bakke).
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ring opinion, Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny and inquired
whether using race as a factor in admissions was necessary to
accomplish a substantial governmental interest.14 Justice Pow-
ell found remedying discrimination and creating a diverse stu-
dent body qualified as constitutionally permissible goals for an
institution of higher education.15 Although Justice Powell held
that the medical school's program did not meet its burden of
proving a substantial governmental interest,16 he did pronounce
that "race or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a par-
ticular applicant's file."17
In Hopwood v. Texas,'8 the district court interpreted Jus-
tice Powell's decision to mean that "[t]he constitutional infir-
mity of the 1992 law school admissions procedure.., is not that
it gives preferential treatment on the basis of race but that it
fails to afford each individual applicant a comparison with the
entire pool of applicants, not just those of the applicant's own
race."' 9 Although the district court found the 1992 admissions
system violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution, the Court did not issue a prospective in-
junction against UT because the law school had already aban-
doned the system.20 The new admissions system did not use
disparate presumptive admission and denial scores or separate
admissions subcommittees. 21 However, the new plan still al-
lowed for the consideration of race in attaining the law school's
goal of minority representation. 22
On appeal, a three judge panel once again found the 1992
admissions program unconstitutional. 23  However, Judge
Smith's majority opinion went further, attacking any considera-
tion of race in new law school admissions programs.24 The
Court held that diversity was an impermissible justification for
14. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305-06 (Powell, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 311-12.
16. Id. at 319.
17. Id. at 317.
18. 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1994), affd 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied
116 S. Ct. 258 (1996).
19. Id. at 579.
20. Id. at 582.
21. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 958.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 932.
24. Id. at 955.
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considering race in admissions programs,25 and that remedying
the "present effects of past discrimination" by the Texas educa-
tional system was not a compelling objective. 26 Racial consider-
ations could only be used to correct discrimination for which the
law school itself was responsible. 27
According to an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, that was
joined by Justice Souter, the United States Supreme Court de-
clined to hear Texas' appeal because the 1992 admissions pro-
gram was no longer in use, and therefore no case or controversy
was before the Court.28 Justice Ginsburg noted that the
Supreme Court is confined to ruling on actual judgments and
not on the lower courts' reasoning.29 Justice Ginsburg wrote,
"we must await a final judgment on a program genuinely in con-
troversy before addressing the important question raised in this
petition."30
Although the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari was in no
way an endorsement of the Fifth Circuit's opinion, it does leave
that decision in place for the states of Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas. The inadequacies and ambiguities festering in the
current state of affirmative action jurisprudence remain un-
resolved. Depending on what qualifies as a remedial purpose
and whether diversity is a compelling objective, any considera-
tion of race in higher education admissions procedures may be
unconstitutional. Affirmative action jurisprudence is unques-
tionably in a state of flux. Rather than constantly revising af-
firmative action doctrine to restrict the circumstances under
which race may be considered, universities should experiment
with affirmative action programs that do not rely upon immuta-
ble characteristics in decisionmaking. Empirical data concern-
ing the individual candidate's background, education, economic
circumstances, history and personal skills should be considered.
25. Id. at 941-48.
26. Id. at 948-52.
27. Id.
28. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2581.
29. Id.
30. Id.
1996]
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Diversity
Beginning with the rejection of the doctrine of "separate
but equal" in Brown v. Board of Education, 1 the courts have
tried to carve out the permissible boundaries for the use of race
in the allocation of benefits. The United States Supreme Court
has been increasingly restrictive in permitting the use of racial
criteria in affirmative action programs by adopting a stricter
view of the circumstances under which a program is narrowly
tailored to meet a compelling government interest.
Historically, the Court has wrestled with the function of
race in decisionmaking, offering as a justification both the socio-
logical benefits of diversity and our societal obligation to rem-
edy discrimination. Constitutional jurisprudence has
acknowledged, albeit tacitly, that the remedy to the malady of
discrimination and segregation is to use racial homeopathy.
The Supreme Court first recognized the importance of di-
versity in quality education when it declared that Texas' system
of segregated law schools was unconstitutional.3 2 Although the
University of California's quota system was not deemed neces-
sary to promote a diverse student body, Justice Powell ruled in
Bakke that it "clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal."33
It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be mem-
bers of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an
undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that en-
compasses a compelling state interest furthers a far broader array
of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic ori-
gin is but a single though important element. 34
Justice Powell stressed the importance of treating each appli-
cant as an individual in the admissions process, but also noted
that race could be used as a "plus" in an applicant's file in the
interest of diversity.3 5
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (Justice Vinson declared,
"[flew students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views
with which the law is concerned.").
33. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-12.
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 317.
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While Justice Powell sought to constrict the boundaries for
the consideration of race,36 some commentators have suggested
that universities have used the ambiguities in Justice Powell's
decision to expand the function of race in admissions. 37 The
similarities between UT's 1992 admissions program and the ad-
missions program struck down in Bakke add support to the
proposition that universities are practicing exactly what Justice
Powell forbade in Bakke. Critics also suggest that universities
are acting under the guise of the diversity rationale to pursue
objectives that Powell did not have in mind.38 Although the le-
gitimacy of these criticisms remains controversial, it is clear
that the diversity concept is still ambiguous and is subject to
widely varying interpretations and abuses.
The Supreme Court's ambiguous precedents covering af-
firmative action do not consistently support the position that
race-based affirmative action should be limited to specific reme-
dial actions. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,9 the Court
warned that classification based on race should be strictly re-
served for remedial settings.40 One year later, the Court in
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C. 41 upheld the interest of ob-
taining diversity of viewpoints in broadcasting as an "impor-
tant" interest under the more lax and now defunct intermediate
scrutiny standard.42 However, the Court overruled some, if not
all, of Metro Broadcasting in Adarand Construction, Inc. v.
Pena,43 leaving the status of the diversity rationale clouded once
36. Id. at 318.
37. See, e.g., CARL COHEN, RACE, LIES AND "HoPwOOD" COMMENTARY 39 (1996).
38. Paul Carrington wrote:
By borrowing Justice Powell's term for appropriate race consciousness, the
[diversity] movement is, not to mince words, a fraud. What Justice Powell
approved was the uncoerced race-conscious selection of law students and
teachers in the exercise of professional educational judgment to enhance the
quality of the intellectual life of institutions of higher learning. What the
Diversity ! movement seeks is a payment made by educational institutions,
at the expense of individuals seeking admission or employment, to compen-
sate members of groups said to be disadvantaged by historic injustices to
their ancestors.
Paul D. Carrington, Diversity !, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1992).
39. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
40. Id. at 470.
41. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
42. Id. at 566.
43. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
1996]
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again. While not addressing the diversity justification, Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the majority in Adarand attempted to
leave a little room for race-based programs.44 Specifically, Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that the correction of the "unhappy persis-
tence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in this country" was an
example of a permissible state interest.45 However, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion46 recognized the legitimacy of the diversity rationale in the
context of higher education, while noting that "its precise con-
tours are uncertain."47
Despite the subtle inference that diversity may be a per-
missible rationale upon which to justify the use of race-based
considerations, the Supreme Court has voiced a growing paro-
chialism relative to the use of race in decisionmaking. Justice
Douglas wrote in Defunis v. Odegard,48 "if discrimination based
on race is constitutionally permissible when those who hold the
reins can come up with 'compelling' reasons to justify it, then
Constitutional guarantees acquire an accordion like quality."49
In Croson and Adarand the Court applied a standard of strict
scrutiny to racial classifications in order "to 'smoke out' illegiti-
mate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursu-
ing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool."50 In Wygant, the Court disapproved of giving preferential
protection against layoffs to minority teachers in order to pro-
vide pupils with role models because the "role model theory...
has no logical stopping point."51 The diversity rationale in this
context is particularly problematic because it sanctions the con-
tinued use of racial criteria indefinitely.
44. Id. at 2117.
45. Id.
46. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
47. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
48. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
49. Id. at 343.
50. Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112 (1995) (quoting JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
at 493).
51. 476 U.S. at 275.
[Vol. 17:27
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss1/2
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
If the Court is trying to fashion legal doctrine to keep close
tabs on the use of race, then allowing the "amorphous"52 ration-
ale of diversity to satisfy the requirements of strict scrutiny
would be fundamentally incompatible. Any systematic consid-
eration of race as a "plus" factor in decisionmaking does not fur-
ther the interest of diversity. In Hopwood, Judge Smith
explained, race often is said to be justified in the diversity con-
text, not on its own terms, but as a proxy for other characteris-
tics that institutions of higher education value but that do not
raise similar constitutional concerns. Unfortunately, this ap-
proach simply replicates the very harm that the Fourteenth
Amendment was designed to eliminate.53
Using race per se as does not necessarily obtain a variety of
viewpoints in the classroom setting. Allowing racial considera-
tions for the purpose of achieving diversity is an underinclusive
method because although one's personal views and experiences
may be significantly affected by race, a variety of other factors
are related as well.
In many instances, religion, socio-economic class, stability
of family, community, religion, sexual orientation and even
birth order may have as significant an influence on our experi-
ence as race. 54 Cheryl Hopwood herself had a unique back-
ground because she was the mother of a severely handicapped
child.55 While UT was entitled to determine that Hopwood's
personal factors did not enhance the school's diversity, the
school should not be allowed to give other applicants an auto-
matic advantage based on immutable characteristics. Member-
ship in a minority group does, of course, profoundly impact one's
life experience and may endow an applicant with a unique per-
spective that an equally qualified non-minority applicant could
not provide. However, universities can achieve diversity
52. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 614 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing the diversity interest as "amorphous").
53. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946. See also Richard Posner, The DeFunis Case and
the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV. 1, 9 (1974) (arguing that using race as a proxy for other characteristics gives
legitimacy to racial discrimination).
54. See Carrington, supra note 38, at 1142.
55. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
1996]
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through an application process based on "other, more germane
bases of classification."56
A study by The Los Angeles Times on race-based affirmative
action programs in the workplace showed that these programs
often caused conflicts, not only between whites and minorities,
but also between different minority groups.57 If the message of
the UT 1992 admissions program is that the marginally admit-
ted African-American and Mexican-American applicants are es-
pecially qualified because they have overcome a unique
experience of racism and disadvantage, value could be assigned
to these criteria in the admissions process.
The goal of obtaining a diverse student body should cer-
tainly guide UT's admissions practices. However, applying dif-
ferent admissions criteria for different races is not the only
solution to ensuring adequate representation of minorities. An
assertion that the varying experiences of different races pre-
cludes them from being judged by common criteria contradicts
the very notion of a universal rule of law.58 Common standards
must be developed that emphasize our common attributes and
remove factors that sort applicants by race.
Present Effects of Past Discrimination
The second basis upon which preferential affirmative action
programs have been developed is remedial in nature. In accord-
ance with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit
upheld the use of race conscious affirmative action to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination. 59 However, Judge
Smith found that UT's plan was still unconstitutional because
no present effects of past discrimination at the law school had
been identified, and correcting the effects of discrimination in
Texas' educational system in general was impermissible.60 This
holding conflicts with other court mandates which command
states to desegregate their systems of higher education. None-
56. Mississippi Univ. For Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).
57. Rich Connell & Sonia Nazario, Curbing Job Bias: A Mixed Balance Sheet,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995 at Al, A24.
58. Walter E. Williams, False Civil Rights Vision and Contempt for the Rule of
Law, 79 GEo. L.J. 1777 (1991).
59. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949.
60. Id. at 955.
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theless, the difficulties raised by the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Hopwood exposed the thorny nature of designing race-based re-
medial measures to cure discrimination.
While the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the use
of race in affirmative action programs, the Court has also recog-
nized that the states have an affirmative duty to wipe out traces
of segregation in public schools. In Green v. County School
Board Of New Kent,6' Justice Brennan found that a southern
school board must do more than merely end de jure segrega-
tion.62 More recently, the Court found Justice Brennan's man-
date to eliminate racial discrimination "root and branch"63
extended to systems of higher education. 64 In United States v.
Fordice, Justice White recognized that "even after a State dis-
mantles its segregative admissions policy, there may still be
state action that is traceable to the State's prior de jure segrega-
tion and that continues to foster segregation."65 States have an
affirmative duty to take steps to desegregate their public
schools if existing racial imbalance in the system is attributable
to the state, and if current policies perpetuate past de jure
segregation.66
Justice White's mandate to take affirmative steps to end
the effects of de jure segregation may have particular force at
UT. The Education Department's Office for Civil Rights is plan-
ning to investigate whether Texas has gone far enough in its
desegregation efforts in light of Fordice.67 Since Fordice rele-
gated the development of desegregation strategies to the states,
the court's decision has been read by some to give the nineteen
southern states wide latitude in developing remedies to deseg-
regate institutions of higher education.68 Assuming that
Fordice affords UT the ability to use race classifications to cor-
61. 391 U.S. 430.
62. Id. at 1694. De jure segregation is segregation resulting from intentional
state action.
63. Green, 391 U.S. at 438.
64. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
65. Id. at 729.
66. Id. at 727.
67. See, e.g., Patrick Healy, Conflicting Court Rulings, CHRON. OF HIGHER
EDUC., May 10, 1995, A39.
68. See, e.g., id. at A35.
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rect the present effects of past discrimination, UT would be
caught between two conflicting court rulings.
The Supreme Court has never articulated with the preci-
sion of the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood exactly what instances of
discrimination merit a race-based remedy. In the context of so-
cietal discrimination, it seems impossible to develop a legal
formula that would properly identify the cause of discrimina-
tion in a manner that recognizes the multitude of sources. Both
the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit intended to encourage
state actors, especially universities, to pursue affirmative action
programs that do not perpetuate race conscious processes.
Ideally, Constitutional Law sets forth abstract principles
that apply equally to everyone, rather than an approach based
on policy decisions that yield haphazard results. By focusing on
equal and just results for a particular group, instead of an equal
and just process for all individuals, the race-conscious admis-
sions procedures create different rules for different people.
Even though'these programs are motivated by the best of inten-
tions, the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act 69 are compromised based on the par-
ticular sociological, economic or political climate. In this scena-
rio, the status of our rights as individuals is contingent on the
"ebb and flow of political forces."70 In addition, the ability of
policymakers to work in concert to achieve justice by creating
equal results for all groups and subgroups is highly suspect.
The benefit bestowed on one group by considering race
translates into a penalty on members of other groups. The 1992
UT admissions program, for example, gave special considera-
tion to African-Americans and Mexican-Americans, but did not
create any special system for Native Americans, Asian-Ameri-
cans or a plethora of other minority groups that have suffered
long histories of discrimination and oppression. Are applicants
to assume that these groups are undeserving of special treat-
ment or that African-American and Mexican-Americans are es-
pecially handicapped in comparison to these other minority
groups? Either way, the symbolic message of the admissions
program is negative and counterproductive as a means of end-
ing discrimination.
69. 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. (1996).
70. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
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There are numerous examples of how affirmative action
programs benefiting one group have handicapped members of
other groups. Early estimates of what will happen when the
University of California at Berkeley ceases to use race consider-
ations suggest that Asians more than Whites have been grossly
underrepresented due to the school's affirmative action pro-
grams. 71 This benign racial classification worked like the quo-
tas that used to limit the number of Jews in universities. In
Podberesky v. Kirwan,72 the constitutionality of the University
of Maryland at College Park's scholarship exclusively for Black
students was challenged by a Hispanic student who had been
denied the scholarship. 73 In United Jewish Organization of Wil-
liamsburgh, Inc., v. Carey, 74 the Supreme Court upheld a redis-
tricting reapportionment plan that drew district lines that
increased the representation of Blacks, but also diluted the rep-
resentation of the Hasidic Jewish community. 75 Using race in
admissions criteria often does not cure discrimination, it just
reorganizes the victims of discrimination.
There is a need for broader recruitment of, and compensa-
tory training for, individuals who have not had adequate pri-
mary and secondary school education. There is also a need to
develop university admissions criteria that can determine the
true potential of individual applicants. Unfortunately, UT
chose to experiment with an admissions program based on race
without first considering race-neutral alternatives.
Admissions procedures should directly target applicants
with diverse views and disadvantaged backgrounds, rather
than using race as a proxy for other characteristics. Alternative
admissions procedures could include special provisions to bol-
ster the representation of low-income applicants. A "plus fac-
tor" could be given to applicants from economically depressed
geographical locations. The diversity of one's experiences can
also be ascertained through essay questions. These procedures
may not be as administratively convenient as using race, 76 but
71. See, e.g., Peter Shaw, Counting Asians, NAT'L REV., Sept. 25, 1995, at 50.
72. 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
73. Id. at 152.
74. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
75. Id. at 168.
76. See Posner, supra note 53, at 9-12 (arguing that administrative conven-
ience is a prominent and unjustifiable cause for using race classifications).
1996]
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administrative convenience has never been held to be a compel-
ling interest.7 7 These alternative procedures avoid the pitfalls
of stereotyping applicants and give applicants the benefit of in-
dividual consideration.
Putting energy into developing alternative means of affirm-
ative action, as opposed to exerting effort defending problematic
race-based affirmative action, may yield better results. Until
such an approach is given full effect, race-based methods are
not conclusively the most narrowly-tailored means of con-
fronting discrimination and promoting diversity. The court's
quandary in defining when race-based measures can be used to
achieve these laudable goals suggest that the means are ill-fit-
ted to the ends.
Critics may suggest that there is no meaningful difference
between distinctions based on an applicant's race and distinc-
tions based on other characteristics 78 such as alumni relatives,
special talents or athleticism. This critique is suspect because
it fails to account for the significant difference between talents
achieved through personal choice, discipline and hard work ver-
sus immutable characteristics over which the individual has no
control. While it is true that valuing legacies or nepotism as-
signs benefit based on immutable characteristics, this flaw does
not justify the continued use of immutable characteristics. Uni-
versities should actively remove artificial distinctions instead of
adding new ones in an attempt to reach equilibrium.
Conclusion
By developing alternative means of affirmative action that
include a more fundamental restructuring of how admissions
procedures are organized, institutions of higher education can
navigate successfully the waters between the Fifth Circuit's re-
strictions on using race in decision-making and the Supreme
Court's mandate to desegregate institutions of higher educa-
tion. It is possible to account for the effects of discrimination
without practicing racial discrimination.
77. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 341.
78. See, e.g., Terrance Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education:
Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653, 670-75
(1975).
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